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Alice Is Not Hysterical Anymore:
Revision and History in Joan Schenkar’s Signs of Life
C. E. Atkins
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Ph.D. candidate at the
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 She is at
 
work on a  
dissertation that
 explores how contem
­porary women authors
 write about rape.
Joan Schenkar’s darkly comic theater inhabits the
 
juncture of history and revision. Blending “untram
­meled nastiness” (Diamond 99) with pathos and
 
rage,  
Schenkar’s plays defamiliarize the familiar, eliciting a
 “shudder of recognition” from spectators as she navi
­
gates
 the politics of gender, sexuality, violence, histo ­
ry, and language. In the play Signs of Life (1979),
 Schenkar creates an embroidery of characters based
 on nineteenth-century historical figures and juxta
­poses them in ways that foreground the misogyny of
 the Victorian era as well as contemporary hatred of
 women. Among those figures Schenkar draws upon
 for the
 
play are  the American showman P. T. Barnum,  
writer Henry James, his “hysterical” sister Alice,
 Joseph Merrick, more commonly known as “the Ele
­phant Man,” and Dr. Marion Sims, the famous gyne
­cologist. In the author’s note, Schenkar provides for
 the reader/spectator the factual information she is
 drawing on, although she calls the possibility of facts
 themselves into question in the same breath, collaps
­ing the historical, momentarily, into theater itself:
Art made from extreme situations can often find
 
its “facts” (i.e. the hinges upon which certain of
 its circumstances swing) in history. Thus, the
 Uterine Guillotine expertly wielded 
by
 Dr. Slop-  
er in Signs of  Life was invented and named  by  the  
founder of American gynecology, Dr. Marion
 Sims — a man who “performed” countless cli
­toridectomies and referred to himself
 
in writing  
as “the architect of the vagina.” Thus, too, Alice
 James’s “companion” really was Katherine Lorn-
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ing, Jane Merritt, the Elephant Woman, had a
 
male counterpart  in the nar ­
rative of the Elephant Man by Frederick Treves, and Henry James’s burn




The play is a departure from linear narrative, relying heavily on a series of
 
flashback scenes that periodically disrupt the present-time tea party between
 Dr. Sloper (a character based on Dr. Marion Sims and named after a character
 in James’s fiction), Henry James, and, 
later,
 P. T. Barnum. Schenkar’s play 
embeds enough factual information and recognizable people that, as Vivian
 Patraka suggests, “Her own version of history supplants the real one” (“Mass
 Culture” 
28).
 More importantly, perhaps, than changing the history books, 
Schenkar is engaged in the project of revising culturally constructed categories
 and beliefs such as deformity, hysteria, sexuality, woman, male authority, and
 patriarchal institutions such as the medical industry. In this essay I will locate
 specific sites in Schenkar’s play where the playwright revises or changes histo
­ry and where she challenges cultural fictions that pathologize all categories of
 otherness. Through
 
her exploration of nineteenth-century gender ideology and  
concepts of deformity, Schenkar reinvents, for example, the very category and
 definition of “freak” and challenges ideologies that attach disgust to women’s
 bodies. I focus in particular on how Schenkar both incorporates and revises the
 biographical histories of Joseph Merrick, Alice James, and Dr. Marion Sims as
 a means of making strange the pathologization of women, freaks, and hyster
­ics.
History, as Walter Benjamin notes, has been written by the winners in any
 
particular era. With this in mind, Schenkar’s Signs of Life approaches the past
 from a historical materialist viewpoint: “If one asks with whom the adherents
 of historicism actually empathize . . . the answer is 
inevitable:
 with the victor.  
. . . [A] historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as pos
­sible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain” (Benjamin
 257). A totalizing history 
can
 never produce anything other than falsehood.  
Writing about how Columbus’s acts of genocide have been subsumed and
 accepted as part of the price of progress, Howard Zinn argues that “the histo
­rian’s distortion is more than
 
just technical, it is ideological; it is released in a  
world of contending interests, where any chosen emphasis supports some kind
 of interest, whether economic or
 
political or racial or national or sexual” (9-10).  
Schenkar’s play not only intervenes repeatedly in historical occurrences but also
 interrogates the relationship between history and ideological belief systems. It
 is through the writing of this antagonistic, antihistorical position that Schenkar
 undermines the historical and ideological constructs produced by the makers of
 a patriarchal history. Throughout the play Schenkar plays with the suggestion
 of shared consciousness. The dissolving of boundaries between characters of
 the same gender in particular forges various collective identities. For example,
 Alice James and Jane Merritt share the same props and bedroom, while P. T.
 Barnum and Dr. Sloper echo 
each
 other’s words. This blurring effectively  
locates the familiar in seemingly disparate entities — Jane Merritt’s freakish
­ness becomes inextricable from Alice James’s hysteria.
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Related to Schenkar’s critique of categories that pathologize women and
 
people with disabilities is the 
way
 she renders spectators complicit in the  
pathologization of woman/freak/hysteric. As audience members
 
wait in line to  
purchase tickets and enter the theater, the character of P. T. Barnum mills
 around the theater’s entrance, announcing loudly that he is hawking tickets to
 a “freak show.” The result is that audience members are both constituted as
 voyeurs and made to feel disappointed when the “freaks” never appear:
Since 
we
 are constituted as the freak show audience for Signs of Life, and  
since the freak show is as live as theater is, our own voyeurism as theater
 goers is implicated in the construction of normality and what it represses.
(Patraka, “Notes” 31)
The allure of the freak show is dependent on the titillation posed by the
 
promise of deformity or 
freakishness;
 those spectators whose interest is piqued  
by Barnum’s promise to present something exotic will, through their complici
­ty with the definition of horror, be disappointed 
by
 the fact that the actors,  
including those who portray the supposed “freaks,” all have healthy bodies.
 Schenkar anticipates that such a disappointment might put audience members
 in 
an
 unreceptive mood, which is partly the point: “The scene should induce  
in those members of the audience who actually listened to Barnum’s spiel and
 therefore expected something salacious, a sharp feeling of disappointment. If
 it puts them in 
an
 unreceptive mood — so much the  better. The actors will  only  
have to work harder at seduction” (11).
In the character of Jane Merritt, Schenkar attacks the historical exploita
­
tion of the “elephant man,” Joseph Merrick, in the name of medicine, while
 calling into question categories of
 
freak and woman. At one point Schenkar  
suggests her own connectedness to her
 
fictional elephant woman, and the com ­
parison helps to collapse the distance between the nineteenth and twentieth
 centuries. As she has stated in interviews: “even though I 
speak
 through thou ­
sands of characters I am always displ cing my autobiography onto those his
­torical periods” (Diamond 103). Orphaned and forced to join a circus
 sideshow,
 
the London-born Joseph Merrick was immortalized  in the account  of  
Sir Frederick Treves, a doctor who accidentally wandered upon a “freak”
 sideshow
 
exhibit in London in the late 1800s and discovered the man he would  
later dub “the elephant man.” Treves’s initial impression of Merrick was one of
 condescension and horror: “[it
 
was] the most disgusting specimen of humani ­
ty I have ever seen . . . degraded, perverted, repellent, and loathsome” (quoted
 in Graham and Oehlschlaeger 32). The most obvious “re-vision” in Schenkar’s
 translation of the historical figure of the Elephant Man into the play’s Jane
 Merritt is the 
revision
 of gender. In recasting  the real-life Victorian male child  
born Joseph
 
Merrick in London as a “female child  born to Jane Elizabeth Mer ­
ritt of the city of New York,” Schenkar foregrounds the nineteenth-century
 gender ideology that linked women with pathology, pronouncing
 
women
inherently deformed by virtue of their genitalia: the assumption of
 
women’s special liability to mental sickness by way of her characteristic
3
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menstrual and reproductive functions pushed all
 
women close to the crim ­
inal category. . . . [T]o be a woman was a crime.
(Barker-Benfield 123)
As
 Vivian Patraka suggests, Schenkar’s revision from male to female deformity  
as expressed through the theatrical body of the Elephant Woman is a "cool”
 strategy for articulating
 
the inherent connections that deformity has with nine ­
teenth-century ideologies of gender: Jane Merrrit’s "entire body is deformed,
 with the exception of her
 
genitalia. In a pun on congenital deformity, Schenkar  
ironically suggests that all women are considered freaks and that their sexual
 organs are the locus of their abnormality” (“Notes” 67). The revision of gender
 foregrounds for the spectator the ways women are historically “deformed” by
 virtue of their biology. Woman and freak
 
have been so slyly  linked historically  
that Schenkar attempts to denaturalize the normality of
 
their relationship by  
foregrounding and exposing 
it. Peter Graham and Fritz Oehlschlaeger take Sir Frederick Treves to task for
 falsely constructing Merrick’s history and denying him both humanity and
 agency. Having established himself as the expert fit to shed light on this 
mys­terious anomaly of the human family, Treves proceeded arrogantly to define and
 distort Merrick’s identity. The authors suggest an element of the monomania-
 cal in Treves, who set out to remake his patient as though Merrick 
were
 “a  
ready-made Frankenstein monster to be nurtured and cultured into civility”
 (34). Once Treves overcame 
his
 disgust in the presence of Merrick, he assigned  
to his life a kind of classical, tragic significance rooted in the fact that Merrick
 was simultaneously grotesque and “human.” What Treves’s account both omits
 and contains is startling in its discrepancies. Graham and Oehlschlaeger make
 much of Treves’s 
refusal
 to call Merrick by his Christian name, Josep , and his 
decision instead to use “John”:
How, then, are we to understand his insistence on calling Merrick John?
 
Did that name fulfill a need for Treves that Joseph could 
not?
 Was Treves  
somehow compelled to rename Merrick, to place himself in the role of
 father — must Treves become the giver of the true name?
(54)
Schenkar plays with Treves’s decision to erase Merrick’s name in the play
 
through an imagined dialogue between Doctor Sloper and
 
Merritt’s mother. It  
is here that the playwright suggests that she and the fictional elephant woman
 are in fact one and the same person:
Doctor The name of the child was Jane Merritt. It was not until P. T.
 
Barnum discovered her, that 
she
 became known as  The Elephant Woman.  
MOTHER Joan, I named her Joan — after . . . someone.
(12)
Schenkar here curiously invokes her own name in the text, suggesting the pro
­
ject of “displacing autobiography onto . . . historical periods” and a strategy of
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blurring identity by casting herself among the deformed. Moreover, the shared
 
identities of Merritt and Alice James in the text suggests that Schenkar is cast
­ing herself as hysterical. Despite the mother’s insistence that the child’s name
 is Joan, Doctor Sloper — at once a reincarnation of Dr. Marion Sims, Treves,
 and James’s fictional Sloper, continues to call Joan 
"Jane.
” This basic erasure of  
Merritt/Merrick’s identity is consistent with the account in Graham and
 Oehlschlaeger of Treves’s paternalistic desire to recreate Merrick through his
 own interpretation. Later in the text of
 
the play the Doctor announces with  
clinical arrogance and certainty that "Jane, of course, was her name” (20).
Further exploration of the discrepancies between
 
Merrick’s life and Treves’s  
narrative reveal the 
revision
 of Merrick’s biography by Treves — including the  
story
 
regarding the genesis of his deformity. Treves does not make mention of  
Merrick’s account of 
his
 pregnant mother’s being kicked or traumatized by an  
elephant at a circus show. 
As
 a medical man, Treves no doubt found this expla ­
nation "absurd” (Graham and Oehlschlaeger 
41),
 but it does address a glaring  
gap in Merrick’s history nonetheless. Schenkar restores to a central location
 Merrick’s voice in the construction of his auto/biography — a further gesture
 toward 
revising
 Merrick not as a freak whose only parent was the doctors who  
housed him but as a human agent born of parents for
 
whom he felt love:
MOTHER 
She
 was born at a carnival. I was at a carnival. I was standing  
near an elephant. He turned towards me, I began to bleed . . . and she was
 born RIGHT THERE in the sawdust. (Takes a miniature of herself from
 her reticule and puts it in Jane’s good hand.) Try to keep this longer than




revision Schenkar makes from Treves’s account  is to reinsert  
the love Merrick felt for his mother into the text. F. C. Carr Gomm, a chair
­man of London’s Hospital committee during the time of Merrick’s stay there,
 recalled with certainty in 
his
 letters regarding Merrick a miniature portrait of  
his (Merrick’s) mother that he cherished and kept with him at all times. Treves,
 however, "omits all mention of her miniature portrait” (Graham and
 Oehlschlaeger 53) in his 
text.
 In the play, Schenkar essentially rewrites Mer ­
rick’s mother back into his life — something that history, through
 
Treves, was  
reluctant to do. Jane
 
Merritt is equipped with a miniature  portrait of her  moth ­
er
 
which she looks at constantly, even in the moment of her death.
The ambiguous circumstances of Merrick’s death provide evidence of what
 Schenkar exposes as Treves’s paternalistic relationship to his patient. Unable to
 see or accept Merrick as in possession of his own agency, Treves rules out com
­pletely the possibility
 
of suicide, concluding: "On  Merrick’s last night, he must  
have made the experiment of lying down to sleep. . . . [H]is death was due to
 the desire that dominated his life — the pathetic, but hopeless desire to be like
 other people” (quoted in Graham and Oehlschlaeger 59). Schenkar’s play
 stresses Treves’s historical arrogance and blindness, suggesting Merrick/Mer-
 ritt’s active participation
 
in  the choice between life and death. In the  final scene  
before her death, Jane considers, in what 
appears
 to be a contemplation of sui-
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cide, the painfully fragmented image of woman/freak she sees in the pic-
 
ture/mirror:
JANE (In her good hand she holds the small picture of her mother which
 
she looks into as though it were a mirror[.]) I am looking at my face in the
 mirror — a thing the doctor has forbidden — and I do not believe what I
 see. The sight of my own skin makes me scream. ... I cannot live a long
 time. I cannot hold this head up any longer.... No matter how often I look
 at myself, I still do not know what I really see.
(62)
Jane’s imagination subverts the doctor’s orders here — in 
real
 life Frederick  
Treves forbade Merrick
 
the use of mirrors in his hospital room. Jane, in an act  
that challenges the oppressively paternalistic doctor-patient relationship, cre
­ates a
 
forbidden mirror out of the photographic image of her mother. In oppo ­
sition to Treves’s theory that Merrick died in a "pathetic” gesture of attempted
 "normalcy,” Schenkar proposes that the source of pathos in Merrick/Merritt is
 actually the fragmentation and denial of a holistic self. In Signs of Life, Jane
 Merritt dies in a defiant proclamation of her own uniqueness, the suppression
 of which proved ultimately
 
unbearable.
Schenkar further undermines the historical accuracy of Treves’s account by
 collapsing
 
the identities of doctor and "showman.” While Treves makes a point  
of pathologizing
 
those who exploited Merrick in  their sideshow  act, he neglects  
to consider his own opportunistic exploitation of Merrick’s deformity. The
 doctor-patient relationship is denaturalized through this comparison to the
 freak show proprietor, as Schenkar points out the ways in which such a rela
­tionship lends itself to the abuse of power and to exploitation. The "showman”
 who discovers and
 
pimps the body  of Merrick/Merritt  is not an Englishman, as  
in the historical case of Merrick, but the American P. T. Barnum. Schenkar’s
 decision to stage Barnum as the showman seems to 
suggest
 the extent to which  
the historical treatment and oppression of freak/woman/other has been an
 American project; she thereby implicates her audience. Despite the fact that
 Barnum devoted an enormous amount of his life to the temperance movement,
 Schenkar creates a
 
Barnum who is drunk and  indulgent, and who absolves him ­
self of his role in the traffic of human beings: "BARNUM Damn the fool. I’
ll have 
his
 diploma. Doctors — licensed scoundrels!! That’s what they are . . .  
legal murderers!!” (29). In the text, the doctor and the showman emerge as two
 halves of a single oppressive agent. Both flourish under the grotesque power
 they wield:
DOCTOR How is the lip this morning?
JANE It
 
won’t stop bleeding. I don’t think you should cut it again.
DOCTOR Don’t be ridiculous, my dear. You know you’re much happier
 speaking.
JANE I spoke before. You couldn’t understand me. (Speaking over
 
the pain  
of examination) I’d like to read more of the Bronte sisters. Sometimes I
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DOCTOR (Not listening) What? Oh anything you 
like 
Jane. Shift your 
weight a little please.
(36-7)
This passage reveals what Graham and Oehlschlaeger identify as Treves’s con
­
tempt and condescension toward Merrick as the latter actively engaged in a
 revision of 
himself.
 Though he was born a working-class youth in London,  
Merrick’s illness situated him immediately amongst the wealthy and the edu
­cated. Merrick’s fascination with this culture eventually led to his conception
 of himself as a “gentleman.” Schenkar gives the Merritt of her text an appreci
­ation of fine literature that parallels Merrick’s fondness for such indulgences as
 a “silver-fitted dressing bag” (Graham and Oehlschlaeger 56) that included
 razors, silver brushes, and a cigarette case. As in
 
Treves’s account, the Doctor  
in Signs of Life is not impressed by his patient’s attempts at 
crossing
 class  
boundaries or in 
revising
 her origins.
Through the dialogue with history that the 
play
 invokes, Schenkar revises  
not only the specific historical construct of the Elephant Man/Joseph Merrrick
 but also the very categories of “normality” and “deformity.” 
As
 Patraka points  
out, freakishness and deformity are contextualized by audience expectations,
 and the very structure of the play “demonstrates to the audience the ways we
 create and dictate both normality and abnormality and how they are to 
be
 per ­
formed” (Patraka, “Notes” 66). Those spectators lured by Barnum’s promise of
 the grotesque are thwarted not only by the dearth of actual “freaks” on stage
 
but  
by  the playwright’s foregrounding of “freak” as a cultural concept. In the final  
scene before her death, Jane refers to her body as a “costume, a bad fit” (62) —
 a construction that seems incongruous with her conception of self. In another
 scene the “
freaks
” are taught to embody the characteristics collectively perceived  
by the culture to be specific to the strange and the deformed. This comedic
 framing of notions of abnormality against normality is what Schenkar defines
 as “a parody of all parodies” (quoted in Patraka, “Interview” 192):
WARDEN Now the first thing I want you to learn in this class is how to
 
look. You bettah know you all look
 
REAL disgusting. The lesson  is HOW  
TO LOOK.... [I]n freak
 
class there’s no reason to look down. Everybody  
in the world is already down on you.
(24)
In a subversion of
 
the category of “freak,” Schenkar gives voice to the muted  
voice of the “other.” In the freak class, it is the freaks who ultimately decon
­struct and denaturalize the world: “Dr. Sloper!! He’s 
no
 doctor. . . . He’s a  
ghoul... a grave robber ... a butcher.. . . He’s the . . . he’s . . . he’s . . . he’s the
 freak!!!!” (25).
The demonization of historically revered white male figures such as Dr.
 
Sloper/Sims/Treves and P. T. Barnum forces the spectator to reconceptualize
 and compare notions of
 
“freak,” “deformity,” “normality,” and “woman.” The  
performance of the freak show and the rehistoricizing of difference in relation
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within the narrative of nineteenth-century gender ideology” (Patraka,  
“Mass Culture” 29). Thus the class in the workhouse in which freaks are
 instructed in lessons of abnormality and conventional freakishness necessarily
 suggests the Victorian and modern constructions of “woman.” The blurring of
 identity that
 
the set’s props reveal  leads to the drawing of parallels between ide ­
ologies of “woman” and of “freak.” Given nineteenth-century assumptions that
 located women’s pathology in relation to their genitalia, Schenkar foregrounds
 misogynistic attitudes through the use of metaphor and parody, reconstructing
 her own version of history in relation to woman, freak, and hysteric.
Alice
 
James, sister of novelist Henry and renowned psychologist William,  
grew up in a family where “to
 
be a James and a girl was a contradiction in  terms”  
(Strouse xiii). Though extremely intelligent and precocious, Alice struggled
 throughout her life to reconcile her talents with her father’s belief that women
 
were
 “personifications of virtue, innocent purity, and holy self-sacrifice who  
could dispense with interesting ideas” (xv). Unlike her worldly, successful
 brothers, Alice would suffer a lifelong condition of mental illness, diagnosed at
 various times as “hysteria, neurasthenia, spinal neurosis, spiritual crisis, and
 gout.” Despite a close relationship with his sister, Henry’s letters and memoir
 reveal a distinct tone of
 
impatience and condescension in matters of  intellect  
and illness: “Try not to be ill,” he urged in 1883, “that is all; for in that there is
 a failure” (quoted in Strouse x). While historical biographers have focused on
 the brother-sister relationship as intimate, if not emotionally incestuous,
 Schenkar’s theater subverts this version, casting a parasitic, jealous Henry
 against the formidable, defiant genius of Alice. In her biography of Alice
 James, Jean Strouse notes the anxiety that brother Henry felt with 
regards
to  
his sister’s most private writings and his terror, following her death, regarding
 the diary’s publication: “I am almost sick with terror. . . . [W]hat I should like
 to do ... would 
be
 to edit  this volume with a  few eliminations of text[,] ... give  
it to the world and then carefully burn with fire our own four [un-edited]
 copies” (322). Schenkar decisively foregrounds the historic fact of James’s dis
­pleasure with and ultimate destruction of his sister’s diary, making this act a
 central metaphor for the sibling rivalry that silenced and pathologized Alice
 and contextualized her illness in relation to her powerlessness: “Henry She
 wanted that journal published, you know. 
Released
 into the world from the  
miasmal swamp of her opinions. Naturally, I burnt it to a crisp” (16). In the
 play James seems to feel a literary competition with his sister because of the
 journal, which represents to him a manifestation of her independence from
 him. Ultimately, the historical James concluded that his sister’s strong will —
 something Schenkar symbolizes by means of the journal, was the
 
ultimate cause  
of her downfall. Falling prey to Victorian medical rhetoric that prescribed
 things such as the “resting cure” for women hysterics who read or wrote too
 much, Henry blamed Alice’s poor health on the intensity of her will:
[The diary] puts before me what I was tremendously conscious of
 
in her  
lifetime — that the extraordinary intensity of her will and personalityreal-
 ly would have made the equal, the reciprocal life of a “well” person . . .
 impossible for her, so that her disastrous, her tragic health was in a manner
8
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the only solution for her of the practical problem of life.
(Quoted in Strouse 284)
Schenkar’s Henry mouths a
 
revised version of this actual letter, this time adding  
a possessive pronoun as a means of emphasizing that Alice’s illness wasn’t sim
­ply a response to a life that 
anyone
 would find difficult but stemmed instead  
from a particular life led incorrectly
 
in its stubbornness:
HENRY I have always thought that Alice’s tragic health was, in a manner
 
of speaking, the only solution to the problem of her life.
DOCTOR The only solution we could accept, Mr. James.
(61)
Strouse’s biography of Alice
 
James is careful not to embrace a wholly les ­
bian reading of
 
her subject, insisting that James’s partnership with Katherine  
Loring was an example of the nineteenth century’s ubiquitous romantic female
 friendships: “Her loving, playful, even flirtatious language in letters to her
 friends is characteristic of nineteenth-century correspondence between women
 and should not be mis-read as literally sexual” (168). Schenkar’s version of the
 Loring-James partnership includes a sexual component: “Alice and Katherine
 on the bed, barely visible. The twining of their figures produces on the wall
 behind the bed an image like an elephant moving” (50). While at first this link
­ing of lesbian with the “freak” Merritt may seem 
like
 a portrait of lesbianism as  
monstrous, Ann Wilson suggests that “the image of the elephant is a complex
 image
 
which is associated frequently with the child’s experience of pre-Oedipal  
love” (84). Furthermore, the construct
 
of “freak” having been denaturalized and  
vilified for its oppressive characteristics, the linking of lesbian with freak can
 only
 
be interpreted as a celebratory connection.
On a universal level, Schenkar reconstructs the history of hysteria by ques
­tioning
 
the phallocentric authority of the medical  industry and by reversing  the  
gender of the hysteric. For example, as Dr. Sloper and Henry James sit in the
 genteel setting of a tea room discussing the grotesqueness of Jane Merritt and
 Alice James, the spectator realizes that the men are themselves hysterical.
DOCTOR My dear Mr. James. How 
can
 you compare your brilliant sister  
with my freak of nature? More tea?
HENRY No, no more thank you. My brilliant sister, dear 
doctor,
 spent  
twenty years in bed and
 
produced nothing more than a cancer of the breast.  
If that isn’t freakish . . .
(14-15)
Schenkar gradually reveals that the biscuits and tea that the men are consum
­
ing are in fact blood and bone. James’s initial disgust at discovering the con
­tent of what he is eating is forgotten with the Doctor’s patronizing toast:
Henry It tastes . . . ossified, it tastes . . . god help us ... it tastes 
like
 bone.
DOCTOR Impossible, Mr. James.
9
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 (A  rising  panic.) Dr. Sloper. There is blood in my cup. And there  
is bone in my
 
biscuit.
Doctor Just desserts, Mr. James.
HENRY (Calming.) Ahhh yes. Quite right, doctor.
DOCTOR (The toast.) The 
ladies,
 Mr. James.
HENRY (Remembering.) Ah yes, the ladies, Dr. Sloper.
(17)




 are depathologized from their historical status.  
Inscribing herself in the text, Schenkar identifies with Alice and raises the
 question, as Ann Wilson points out, “of the relation between writing by con
­temporary women, particularly women writing
 
for the theater, and a malady we  
primarily associate with the late nineteenth century’ (73). Hysteria in Signs of
 Life, then, is transformed from a “malady”
 
that afflicts the passive, pathologized  
form of woman, to an act that threatens to “disrupt the phallocentrism of the
 symbolic order.” Schenkar situates Alice’s attacks
 
within feminist  theater’s pro ­
ject of articulating the “spectacle.” As Liz Goodman has argued, it is around
 the term spectacle and around “women’s deliberate efforts to make spectacles
 of themselves’ that much of feminist theater is made possible” (quoted in Wag
­ner 228). In Signs of Life, Alice’s fits work to revise the balance of power
 between men and women — the fits shape her
 
brother’s actions, rendering him  
powerless before her will:
ALICE [T]he only 
way 
I could stir him up was to have an attack in a pub ­
lic place.
KATHERINE What a performer you are!!
(49)
Schenkar’s Alice is prone to 
fits
 in  which she delivers a “sentence” so grotesque  
and disturbing it incites horror in spectators who witness it. While the “sen
­tence” is never revealed by Schenkar, its status as spectacle in the play supports
 a reading of Alice James as a “frightening and rare presence — an unsocialized
 woman . . . who forces men to be passive in the face of her rage . . . and dese
­crates herself as the object of their desire, thereby mocking their sexuality”
 (Dolan 67).
The positioning of Dr. Marion Sims in a play whose project is to revise his
­
torical notions of woman and hysteric necessarily expands this revision to
 include the paradigm of the doctor-patient relationship and the historical rev
­
erence
 for white professional males. Juxtaposing Sims, the self-proclaimed  
“architect of the vagina,” with
 
the pathologized hysteric James, foregrounds the  
historical construction of woman as an enigma whose puzzle could be solved
 through proper excavation of the sexual organs. Sharing the popular nine
­teenth-century belief that a woman’s psychology was entirely determined by her
 biology, Sims embarked on a mission to explore unknown aspects of women’s
 reproductive organs
 
with a relentless determination that  Barker-Benfield  likens  
to “monomania” (93). Perceiving himself to be on a God-given mission, Sims
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constructed a small shack behind his house where he performed 
countless 
experiments upon three black female slaves, one of whom, according to Bark
­er-Benfield, endured no less than thirty operations in four years.
What Schenkar extracts from Sims’s life in creating the Sloper character is
 
both his hatred for women and his love of the theatrical, performative quality
 inherent in surgery. Barker-Benfield notes that Sims harbored a love of things
 theatrical all his life and that he “had met and
 
been fascinated  by P. T. Barnum”  
(100). In a reversal of the patient-as-hysteric paradigm, Schenkar pits
 Sims’s/Sloper’s
 
“hysteria” against the relative health of Alice and Merritt. Slop ­
er is not shy about discussing 
his
 maniacal obsession with women’s grotesque  
bodies. 
As
 he sits drinking blood and chewing on bones, the doctor’s relative  
insanity grows more apparent: “DOCTOR I’ve scooped out ovaries without
 question, extracted uteri without number. . .. [A]hh Mr. James the signs of life
 are closer to the bone than you imagine. And when you find them, there’s no
 stopping until you’re covered
 
with blood” (55-6). Schenkar sets this harrowing  
confession of mutilation against the historical fact of
 
Sims’s notion of himself  
as genius and savior, undermining the historical authority invested in doctors:
 “I feel that I am in the hands of god, that I have a high and
 
holy mission to per ­
form” (quoted in Barker-Benfield 109). The psychic/physical mutilation to
 which the doctor subjects his patients is ultimately pathologized and exposed.
 Retrieving the historically muted voice of the
 
patient, Schenkar revises the doc ­
tor-patient relationship: “ALICE I feel... I feel that one has a greater sense of
 intellectual degradation after an interview with a doctor than from any other
 human experience" (60). Situating the scientific in the performative, Schenkar
 undermines the supposed
 
truths on which the former is based: “I love the false ­
ness of science. I love how it’s no more appropriate than fashion predictions
 and how everything is always being 
reversed
 and denied in science. ... I love  
the artificial” (quoted in Diamond 105).
The pathology of historic “madmen” (Schenkar quoted in Diamond 110)
 
such as Sims who hide behind institutions of science, literature, and entertain
­ment gets exposed in Signs of Life. The perversion of facts in Schenkar’s plays
 is responsible for the retrieval and preservation of larger truths. While Dr.
 Marion Sims and Henry James never actually sat down to 
tea,
 their role as his ­
torical conspirators in the pathologization, mutilation, and suppression of
 women is made clear. The history constructed in Signs of Life is the result of
 the spectator’s negotiation of actual historical representations of woman, freak,
 hysteric, and so on, alongside the deconstruction (through Schenkar’s deliber
­ate perversion) of those representations. Ultimately, Signs of Life serves as a
 commentary on the falseness of history and an exposé of oppressive ideologies
 of gender and deformity that reached an agitated peak in Victorian society
 
yet  
still persist today. Given the omission of the voice of the other in the telling of
 history, all history is essentially in need of revision. By reimagining the bound
­aries between historical time periods and real and imaginary figures, Schenkar
 imposes her version of history upon the “real” one. Employing framing tech
­niques, Schenkar engages the spectator in an active dynamic of refusal and/or
 recognition, inviting us to compare the pathology of hysteria, femininity, and
 deformity, with that of medicine, showmanship, genius, and masculinity.
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